The Impact of the Alice Decision on Corporate Patent Assets

The Impact of the Alice Decision on Corporate Patent AssetsThe Supreme Court’s Alice decision has introduced a dimension of uncertainty associated with the validity of many of the software patents held by operating companies today. There seems to be a consensus among some of the leading academic and judiciary experts supporting that conclusion, as seen in recent comments made by Stanford Law School’s Prof. Mark Lemley, as well as in recent comments by former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Michel. From a valuation and financial reporting perspective, there needs to be a serious examination of the post-Alice landscape implications on the value of patents as corporate assets. The results of such examination may lead to further action – which could range anywhere from additional disclosure requirements by regulators, all the way to actual corporate asset write-offs. This article highlights some of the key issues that need to be addressed by companies and regulators.

Financial Reporting for Intangibles: Overview of Existing Standards

In order to address the Alice decision and its impact on corporate disclosures, one needs to first understand the existing financial reporting requirements and how patents are presented as corporate assets. Under current accounting rules (US-GAAP and IFRS), internally generated intangibles, including patents, do not show as assets on the balance sheets of the companies that created them. Patents only show up on the balance sheet if they were acquired and paid for, either as a standalone portfolio or as part of an M&A deal where the assets of the target include patents. It is important to mention that these patents had no value on the books of the selling company either, so in most cases a transaction where patents are changing hands is the first time that the value of such assets is reported anywhere.

Take, for example, the Google acquisition of Motorola Mobility in 2012. The Motorola Mobility balance sheet on the eve of the acquisition showed virtually no value allocated to patents as corporate assets. Yet, the acquisition resulted in Google reporting $5.5 billion of patents as acquired assets on its post-merger balance sheet. The post-M&A valuation itself is conducted by valuation experts with no particular legal or technical knowledge, who assume that the patents are valid based on the due diligence done by the legal team of the buyers. Assessing the validity of patents as part of a post-merger purchase price allocation is outside the area of expertise of IP valuation experts, as well as the auditors in charge of reporting the deal. Once the pre-merger due diligence is complete, there is no further legal examination of the patents for purposes of financial reporting.

Implications of the Alice Decision on Financial Reporting of Patents

When looking at the financial statements of any company, one needs to keep in mind that there are two types of disclosures for patents: the reported patents, resulting from acquisitions; and the “invisible” patents, those emerging from the company’s own R&D efforts, which are not reported as corporate assets as all. It is usually the case that most of the company’s patents fall under the second category, and in particular when it comes to large tech companies that spends billions of dollars on R&D, resulting in many new patents filed every year.

There is an established process for recording losses related to the decline in value of patents acquired through acquisitions: these patents are tested periodically for “impairment”, a process that involves comparing the carrying amount of an asset (price paid for the asset, or its “book value”) to its fair value (as calculated based on current market conditions). An impairment loss is recognized when the carrying amount of patents is not recoverable and exceeds its fair value. Impairment testing is done when there is an indication that might trigger a decrease in the market price of the asset below its reported book value. There is a list of conditions that the regulators consider as triggers for impairment, including – among others – a significant adverse change in legal factors. It is a grey area involving discretion by management, subject to varying degrees of leniency by the auditors running these impairment tests. It is not immediately clear whether the post-Alice legal ambiguity should be considered a strong enough trigger for impairment testing of certain categories of patents, and if so, what type of testing should be applied, and who should perform the testing. Impairment testing is currently done by valuation experts who lack the legal background to assess the validity risk associated with the patents, and subsequently the assumption of validity is carried over from the original post-merger valuation. More guidance is needed from the FASB and the SEC on that topic since the process, as currently performed, does not lend itself to the inclusion of validity assessment by the valuation experts or the auditors.

While impairment analysis exists for reported intangible, there is no process whatsoever for writing off non-reported intangibles, which include all internally created patents as previously discussed. Since these assets are not on the balance sheet, there is nothing to write off in the first place and no basis against which to conduct an impairment test. From a pure accounting perspective – there is no place to record the loss, and no way to calculate the size of the loss. This does not mean that the markets will not factor that into the stock price, even without specific disclosure by the company. It may very well be that if companies start writing off acquired intangibles, stock analysts and investors could estimate the degree at which a similar write-off could be applied to non-reported patents, and adjust stock price expectations accordingly. While this is all highly speculative and there is no way of telling how stock markets will react, it is not unreasonable to assume that some companies with patents that are directly impacted by the Alice decision might see some sort of market price adjustment based on the higher invalidity risk associated with these assets, even if these patents are not on the balance sheets of these companies.

Implications of the Alice Decision on Compliance with Securities Laws

Financial reporting is the main channel for companies to communicate information to shareholders and markets at large. Financial reporting by US publicly traded companies is regulated by the SEC, and is governed by a set of securities laws and regulations. One should therefore look up to the SEC for guidance related to the post-Alice disclosure requirements to be imposed on companies. More specifically, both Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act as well as Rule 10b-5 compliance are issues that warrant a closer look:

The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act requires management and auditors to establish a level of internal controls that would guarantee the accuracy of reported financial statements. All financial reports need to include an Internal Controls Report showing that a company’s financial data are accurate and that adequate controls are in place. Criminal and civil penalties are imposed for noncompliance. Section 302 requires the CEO and CFO to certify that the reports “fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations” of the company for the periods included in the report. When it comes to IP, the guidelines for SOX compliance are vague and there’s no clear set of steps that companies apply to their IP portfolio to guarantee compliance. This approach might change post-Alice, if large portfolios are at risk of invalidity. It could certainly be considered a “material aspect” yet it is unclear what set of best practices will emerge and how the SEC will enforce them.
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act’s rule 10b-5 lays the foundation for the SEC to investigate possible security fraud claims. Rule 10b-5 violations cover cases where executives make false statements in order to drive up share prices, or where they withhold negative information that could have an adverse impact on stock prices. Violations of 10b-5 open the door to shareholders’ class action litigation as well, especially if stock prices experience fluctuations that can be attributed to material misrepresentations by management. This could create an additional risk of litigation or SEC investigation for companies with a large concentration of patents directly affected by Alice, and should motivate these companies to take a closer look at the value of their IP portfolio and determine whether additional disclosures are prudent under the circumstances.

Article first published on IPWatchDog

Crowdfunding Update: IP Protection and Startup Valuation Considerations

Mary Juetten, CEO of Traklight and Efrat Kasznik, Foresight Valuation

Crowdfunding is expected to become a leading source of financing in the early stage, on both rewards and equity platforms. It is likely to add more transparency to startup valuations and, at the same time, contribute to an upward trend in valuations. However, the lack of attention to IP protection or infringement during the campaign can have negative implications on the valuation of your startup. The topic of IP protection should therefore be top of mind for entrepreneurs engaged in crowdfunding, as it is critical to their survival and success long after the campaign has ended.

Read the full article here .

Business Model Innovation: Why Building a Better Mousetrap is Not Enough

What do solar energy and personal communications have in common? While energy and communications seem unrelated industries, they have significant similarities if one considers the role of business model innovation as a precursor to success in bringing new intellectual property to market. Take, for example, two companies:

•SolarCity Corporation (Nasdaq: SCTY), a solar panel installation company, which is publicly traded with a market cap of over $7 billion; and
•WhatsApp, the text messaging company which was purchased in February 2014 by Facebook for $19 billion.

In a playing field littered with the corpses of failed ventures, these two companies point not necessarily to cutting-edge technology, but rather to filling the gap in a business model as the key enabler of their success. SolarCity had one of the only initial public offerings (IPOs) in the solar industry, an industry known for high failure rates, due primarily to its successful solar system financing program which allows it to distribute a product with a negative return on investment to millions of households. And the recent WhatsApp acquisition is largely attributed to the lack of revenue model agility on the part of incumbent carriers, which created an opportunity for WhatsApp to tap into its user base – and grow to 450 million subscribers worldwide.

SolarCity: making solar systems affordable

In late 2007 I was on the founding team of a residential energy efficiency start-up in Silicon Valley, engaged in developing a data-driven analytical platform for homeowners to understand their energy consumption and savings opportunities. The residential sector has always been a tough nut to crack when it comes to energy efficiency: homeowners are motivated by a complex set of incentives (saving energy, saving cost and reducing their carbon footprint) that often seem at odds with their actual energy consumption behavior. Utilities have been experimenting for years with all types of initiative, ranging from handing out free energy-efficient light bulbs to installing smart meters that would balance off the load during peak hours. Successful IPOs are the exception to the rule in an industry that has grown accustomed to a steady stream of bankruptcies, poor earnings reports and dwindling funding resources.

SolarCity was founded in 2006 and was originally backed by Elon Musk, the maverick Silicon Valley entrepreneur, who is also the founder of successful electric vehicle company Tesla Motors. The company designs, installs and maintains photovoltaic (PV) solar systems on residential rooftops. Solar panel installation is a lucrative business. Most of the money being made in the solar industry does not come from making and selling solar panels, where the market is flooded with cheap PV panels from Asia. A recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study found that in residential systems, solar panels typically account for only 20% of the overall cost of the system. The rest includes the cost of electricians to install the panels and hardware to connect the systems to the grid. Most of that money goes to companies like SolarCity.

From an economic standpoint, residential solar systems are expensive to install and do not actually pay back in energy savings over the duration of typical home ownership, which creates a major hurdle to adoption. The key difference between SolarCity and many other solar companies is that its strategy is not based on innovative new PV panel technology; rather, its competitive edge lies in utilizing existing solar technology with an innovative approach to financing the panel installation. Instead of asking for a big upfront payment, the company created a financing program whereby it leases the systems to homeowners. The lease payments are offset by power savings from reduced electric bills and the surplus electricity that can be sold back to the local utility. By doing that, SolarCity has managed to convert a product with a negative return on investment to an affordable energy-efficiency solution.

WhatsApp: picking up the slack in messaging services

Telecom research company Ovum Ltd estimated that service providers worldwide lost about $32.5 billion in 2013 in text messaging revenues to free social messaging applications like WhatsApp, a loss that is projected to reach $54 billion by 2016. Internet-based messaging services have particularly increased outside the United States, where carriers charge high fees for texting on top of the regular voice and data plans. In order to protect their text-messaging subscribers, US carriers began to offer flat-rate, unlimited text messaging in many of their plans. However, carriers in other parts of the world are largely affected by the proliferation of free social messaging apps: in Mexico, for example, it is estimated that about 90% of all instant messaging goes through WhatsApp.

For much of the past three decades, voice has dominated the revenue streams for almost all telecoms operators. The changing face of the mobile industry affected the business models and revenue structure of service providers. In 2013 voice revenues were expected to fall below the 60% threshold globally for the first time. The drop in voice revenues has been compensated by the rise of messaging and data revenues, as service providers try to keep the overall average revenue per user (ARPU) at stable levels. A ‘perfect storm’ set of circumstances created the fertile ground for WhatsApp to take over the market: the ubiquitous broadband internet access, the proliferation of mobile devices and the gap in business model on the part of the service providers. These circumstances pushed subscribers to adopt free personal communication applications at increasing rates.

One might argue with the price paid by Facebook for WhatsApp’s massive user base, but this acquisition was definitely triggered by the global accelerated growth of WhatsApp, which would not have been possible but for the gap in revenue model that caused telecoms companies to lose users that they already own, due to the wrong billing model. It remains to be seen how WhatsApp’s 450 million users will be monetized by Facebook, but this represents a missed opportunity for the service providers whose focus on maintaining their ARPU metrics and existing billing structure is causing them to lose sight of some of the new revenue opportunities in telecoms services today.
In some industries it is not enough to build a better mousetrap. Often, the key to product or service success in the marketplace hinges on coupling intellectual property with the right business and revenue model

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